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Debates with Authors 
Evidence or Assertions? The Outcomes of Family 
Preservation Services 
Julia H. Littell 
Bryn Mawr College 
In their review of research on the effects of family preservation services in 
child welfare, Howard Bath and David Haapala (Social Service Review 68 [Sep- 
tember 1994]: 386-404) raise questions about the validity of three recent 
controlled studies in this area.1 The results of at least two of these studies 
challenge the widely held notion that family preservation services (FPS) are 
effective in preventing the out-of-home placement of children. Careful exami- 
nation of the studies' methods, thoughtful interpretations of findings, and 
efforts to integrate this information into existing knowledge about the effects 
of FPS are clearly warranted. 
When faced with empirical evidence that contradicts theory, one can dismiss 
the new evidence, attempt to modify the theory, or ignore the discrepancy. The 
article by Bath and Haapala presents one approach to the reconciliation of 
apparent contradictions between theory and research on the effects of FPS.2 
After an attempt to dismiss the null findings of several randomized experiments 
on methodological grounds, the authors cite studies that employed much weaker 
designs as support for their hypothesis that FPS prevent out-of-home placements. 
The authors' criticisms of the randomized experiments are incomplete and 
often inaccurate. They use assertions rather than evidence to dismiss the 
findings of these studies. Their failure to take into account issues of validity 
in studies that appear to support their own beliefs constitutes a serious lapse, 
one that results in misrepresentation of the weight of the evidence in this 
field. Their review also misses important lessons that can be drawn from the 
research in this area. 
Statistical Power 
The claim that "design weaknesses leading to low statistical power are largely 
responsible for the negative conclusions drawn from the state-initiated experi- 
Permission to reprint a comment printed in this section may be obtained only from 
the author. 
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mental FPS evaluations" (p. 389) deserves close examination. Bath and 
Haapala assert that the statistical power in these studies was low as a result 
of the heterogeneity of respondents, treatment inconsistency, and instability 
of outcome measures. The authors never mention the size of effects the studies 
should have been able to detect, the level of power desired, or the sample 
sizes required to meet these goals-nor do they present convincing evidence 
that the experiments fell short of these goals. 
Although it has been claimed that FPS result in dramatic reductions in the 
proportion of cases that require placement," evaluations should be designed 
to detect more modest effects. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume 
that a reduction in the risk of placement of 20 percent has some practical 
significance. Although we may want to detect smaller differences (say, 10%), 
these are unlikely to be meaningful for policy purposes. Assuming the use of 
a one-tailed test and an alpha level of .05, the power to detect between-group 
differences of 20 percent (centered on 50%) was approximately .88 in New 
Jersey, .97 in California, and over .99 in Illinois.4 This means that there was 
an 88-99 percent chance that the experiments would have detected program 
effects of 20 percent or more if the programs had such effects. Levels of power 
of this magnitude are more than adequate for research on treatment effects.5 
The Illinois study had the statistical power to detect even smaller effects 
within 1 year after random assignment.6 In fact, a very small but statistically 
significant difference between groups was found in Illinois: FPS appeared to 
result in an overall increase in the risk of placement for children-an increase 
of approximately 5 percent at 1 year after referral.' This effect could be 
attributed to the "case finding" phenomenon Bath and Haapala describe, 
although the gap between the experimental and control groups in placement 
rates disappeared once variations in case characteristics were taken into 
account.8 
Heterogeneity of Respondents 
This brings us to the issue of heterogeneity of respondents and the problems 
this poses for the design and interpretation of FPS evaluations. It is true that 
family preservation programs serve a very diverse clientele, and, as Bath and 
Haapala argue, such heterogeneity can reduce statistical power. 
We are concerned here with client heterogeneity as it affects the main 
dependent variable, that is, the likelihood of placement. In this respect, Bath 
and Haapala cite studies in which there were differences among subgroups 
in the rates of placement after FPS treatment. The authors refer to this as 
evidence of the "differential effectiveness" of FPS (p. 390). Because there are 
also differences among subgroups in the likelihood of placement in the absence 
of FPS, a comparison of subgroup placement rates after FPS is not sufficient 
to determine whether the program has differential effects. Program effects 
(and differential effects) can be gauged only by comparing "base rates" of 
placement in the absence of FPS with rates after FPS intervention. Information 
on subgroup "base rates" can be obtained from control groups in random- 
ized experiments. 
As Bath and Haapala noted, most studies have not had the sample sizes 
needed to examine program effects for specific subgroups of clients. But the 
authors failed to present the evidence that does exist in this area. The Illinois 
experiment included examination of program effects for 16 subgroups.9 Con- 
trary to Bath and Haapala's claims,'0 all but three of these subgroups had 
sample sizes sufficient to detect program effects of 20 percent at a level of 
power of .8." Results showed that FPS increased the risk of placement for 
households headed by single adults but had no effect for any of the other 
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subgroups.12 The program also had no effect on the risk of subsequent mal- 
treatment for any of the subgroups.13 Hence, at least in the Illinois study, there is no reason to believe that heterogeneity is an explanation for nega- 
tive findings. 
Treatment Inconsistency 
Bath and Haapala suggest that "uncertainty about what the interventions ... 
actually consisted of ... suggests poor construct validity" (p. 392). On the 
contrary, reports on each of the three experiments include extensive analysis 
and discussion of the nature of services provided to clients.14 
Lack of consistency in the treatment of clients both within and across sites 
is a reality-in FPS and in virtually any social program. Because the nature 
of family problems varies from one case to the next and because the commu- 
nity and social settings in which FPS operate are quite diverse, these programs 
are never "single undifferentiated entities."15 Attention to variations in the 
treatment provided to families within these studies indicates that the experi- 
ments were not based on the assumption that the treatment was undifferenti- 
ated. Although the authors point to the New Jersey experiment as "the study 
that had the most consistent intervention" (p. 398), Leonard Feldman's analy- 
sis showed significant between-site differences in the duration and intensity 
of services provided to clients in that state.16 
The approach taken in Illinois was that it made sense to accept variation 
within the FPS program because there is no evidence of the superiority of 
any one model over another. The Illinois study can be viewed as a natural 
experiment in which variations among programs can be examined. This exper- 
iment included 18 programs in six sites.17 Three of the six experimental sites 
(two in Chicago and one in Peoria) had sample sizes sufficient to detect pro- 
gram effects of 20 percent (centered on 50%) at a level of power of .8. Site- 
specific analyses showed that children in the FPS groups in both of the Chicago 
sites were significantly more likely to be placed than children in the control 
groups in those sites.18 Differences in placement rates between the program 
and control groups in the Peoria site (which had a single FPS provider) were 
not significant.19 
There is no foundation for the statement that "had positive effects been 
demonstrated in these studies, it would have been impossible to specify what 
exactly was responsible for obtaining the results" (p. 392). The Illinois study 
was certainly large enough to support analyses of this kind-and, in fact, my 
colleagues and I have reported results of analyses of relationships between 
FPS service characteristics and outcomes.20 
Placement as an Outcome Measure 
As Bath and Haapala suggest, there are a number of problems with the use 
of placement as an outcome.21 However, contrary to their suggestion, these are 
not related to the stability (reliability) or validity of placement as an outcome 
measure.22 The authors have confused issues in the reliability and validity of 
measures with questions about the appropriateness and interpretation of an 
outcome variable. 
The reliability of placement as an outcome measure appears to be quite 
straightforward: we want to know whether placement has occurred for each 
case at various points in time after referral to FPS. Data on placement events 
can be derived from state foster care records. In many states, these records 
are computerized and updated continuously; they are used to track children 
in the foster care system and for payment purposes. When linked to payments 
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for foster care, the reliability of data on placements is supported by the fact 
that there are negative fiscal consequences (to either payor or payee) if data 
are entered incorrectly.23 In Illinois these records appear to be fairly reliable 
(although, to my knowledge, there have been no empirical studies of the 
reliability of administrative data on placements). In some studies, information 
on placements has also been obtained directly from caseworkers and parents, 
who are presumably knowledgeable about the placement status of certain 
children. Variations in definitions of placement across studies and changes 
over time in placement policies and rates within jurisdictions raise issues of 
external validity (i.e., whether the findings apply to other settings and periods 
of time), not reliability. There is no support for the statement that "placement 
status is an unstable measure with an inherently large error variance, which, 
in turn, contributes to small effect sizes" (p. 393). 
With respect to construct validity, Bath and Haapala suggest that placement 
is "only an indirect and distal measure of the family functioning changes that 
FPS interventions claim to be able to make in order to avert placements" 
(p. 392, emphasis added). Because placement prevention has been the primary 
objective of FPS, placement is a direct measure of whether a program does 
what it was intended to do, not a proxy for something else. As long as there 
are claims that FPS "are able to prevent out-of-home placements" (p. 399), 
such claims must be tested through the use of placement as an outcome 
variable. However, this is not the only relevant outcome. The effects of FPS 
on various aspects of child and family functioning are important-and these 
effects have been examined in several studies.24 
The view that many child welfare placements are "unnecessary" and that 
placements are "failures" of FPS is a social construction of reality. The use of 
placement as an outcome measure in evaluation research does not mean that 
placement is necessarily a bad thing. Counting placements is not the same 
thing as counting "failures." Any positive or negative connotation is in the 
eyes of the beholder, and, as Bath and Haapala suggest, the meaning of out- 
of-home placement depends to a great extent on the circumstances of the 
individual case. The recognition that placements are necessary and "good" in 
some cases raises questions about the wisdom of placement prevention as an 
overriding objective of FPS. 
Internal Validity 
Bath and Haapala suggest that the findings of little or no difference between 
program and control groups may have occurred as a result of diffusion, imita- 
tion, or compensatory equalization of treatments.25 If cases in the control 
groups received services that were similar to FPS, comparable outcomes would 
be expected. Comparisons of the amounts and types of services provided to 
program and control groups are required to determine whether some equaliza- 
tion of treatments occurred. 
Detailed comparisons of services provided to program and control cases 
were conducted in the Illinois experiment.26 In that study, one-fifth of the 
cases in the control group were never opened for services in the state child 
welfare agency, and 51 percent of those that were opened received no services 
of any kind during the first 90 days after random assignment.27 Overall, the 
control group received far less intensive services than the FPS group (e.g., 
control cases received a median of 2.5 hours of face-to-face contact with 
workers in the first 90 days of service, compared with 70.3 for FPS cases).28 
Cases in the FPS groups were much more likely to receive counseling (93% 
vs. 37% of controls) and concrete services (89% vs. 31%).29 The FPS cases 
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received a wider array of concrete services (median of four different types of 
concrete services vs. a median of zero for the control group) and were more 
likely to receive case assistance than controls (74% vs. 7%). 30 Interviews with 
a subsample of clients in the experiment support the conclusion that FPS 
cases received much more extensive help than cases in the control group."' 
Interviews with public child welfare workers helped to confirm and explain 
these differences: workers who served cases in the control group usually 
wanted to provide better services for their clients but were simply unable to 
do so given much higher caseloads (an average of 50, compared with five for 
FPS workers).32 So we can conclude that, in Illinois at least, internal validity 
was not threatened by diffusion or imitation treatments or by compensa- 
tory equalization. 
There are other issues of internal validity that Bath and Haapala did not 
address. In the New Jersey experiment, 22 percent (33) of the 150 cases 
assigned to the FPS group were not provided with FPS because they did not 
meet the eligibility criteria, the caregiver refused to participate in the program, 
or a child was considered at risk of harm and removed from the home.33 These 
cases were not tracked and were excluded from the analysis. In contrast, all of 
the cases assigned to the control group were retained in that group. The loss 
of a substantial proportion of FPS cases clearly could have affected the compa- 
rability of the experimental and control groups in New Jersey.34 The finding 
of higher placement rates in the control group than the FPS group in New 
Jersey may be due largely to the fact that some "difficult" cases-including 
cases in which placement was truly imminent-were excluded from the FPS 
group but not from the control group. 
Summary 
In the California and Illinois studies, findings that FPS did not prevent place- 
ments cannot be explained by insufficient statistical power or threats to inter- 
nal validity. Although client heterogeneity and treatment inconsistency proba- 
bly had some effect on statistical power, the overall level of power in these 
studies was so high to begin with that it is unlikely that the results can be 
explained by these factors. Further, analyses that took into account client 
heterogeneity and between-site differences in treatments in Illinois confirm 
the findings that FPS did not prevent placements. Claims that outcome mea- 
sures were unstable and that there may have been some equalization of treat- 
ments among experimental and control cases are not credible. 
In New Jersey, it is possible that the exclusion of certain kinds of cases from 
the FPS group (but not from the control group) was responsible for observed 
differences between groups. 
The authors did not explain the fact that a number of statistically significant 
differences in the largest experiment were in the "wrong" direction. (That is, 
the Illinois FPS program appeared to increase the risk of placement for children 
in the Chicago area and for those in single-parent families.) Although Bath and 
Haapala acknowledge the possibility that FPS may have a "case finding" effect, 
it must be understood that this effect is exactly the opposite of what one would 
expect to find if the placement prevention hypothesis were true. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis can be due to several conditions: the 
null hypothesis may be true (i.e., the program may have no effect), the underly- 
ing theory may be faulty, the reliability or validity of measures may be weak, 
or power may be insufficient to detect real differences between groups."5 Bath 
and Haapala's article deals only with issues of validity and statistical power. 
Issues of truth and theory remain. 
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The Weight of the Evidence 
Early evaluations of family preservation services were not "unequivocally posi- 
tive," nor did they all report "high placement prevention success" (p. 387). 
The results of early controlled studies were mixed: four randomized experi- 
ments and one comparison group study found that the programs did not 
produce significant overall reductions in placement.36 Three randomized ex- 
periments found statistically significant-but small-reductions in placement 
in favor of the experimental groups.37 
Of the studies reviewed by Bath and Haapala, only those with the weakest 
controls for threats to internal validity show program effects on placement. 
The authors' emphasis on possible methodological limitations in the three 
focal experiments stands in stark contrast to a complete lack of attention to 
design problems inherent in the quasi experiments they reviewed. 
The quasi experiments employed various overflow designs. Referring work- 
ers can often manipulate these designs to ensure that certain families receive 
intensive services. Some cases that are turned away initially from the program 
may be referred again when there is an opening for services, whereas other 
options (including placement) are pursued in the remaining overflow cases.38 
Without a careful record of the course of each case that enters an overflow 
group, the comparability of the overflow group with FPS cases cannot be 
assured. Thus, overflow studies may suffer from the threats to internal 
validity that Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell termed "selection" and 
"mortality."39 
The overflow studies cited by Bath and Haapala were quite small. The study 
reported by Sally Wood, Keith Barton, and Carroll Schroeder included 26 
families in the FPS group and 24 who did not receive FPS.40 The study by 
Ira Schwartz, Philip AuClaire, and Linda Harris involved an initial sample of 
children who were approved for placement; 58 of these cases were diverted 
to a FPS program, and a random sample of 58 of the cases that remained was 
taken as a comparison group.41 The evaluation of the Utah Homebuilders 
program (reported by Mark Fraser, Peter Pecora, and Haapala) had an over- 
flow comparison group of 38 cases, out of which nearly one-third (12 cases) 
were lost to follow-up.42 This loss of a substantial proportion of comparison 
cases is sufficient to invalidate the study, because the comparability of treat- 
ment and comparison groups cannot be assured. Fraser and his colleagues 
attempted to deal with this problem by matching a subsample of FPS and 
comparison cases on several variables. However, the variables used in the 
matching process were only weakly related to placement, and the number of 
matched pairs was quite small. Further, the researchers in the Utah study 
relied on different sources of information on placements in the program and 
comparison group.43 
Bath and Haapala cite data from the state of Michigan on changes in place- 
ment rates over time as further evidence of the effects of FPS. When these 
data were examined in terms of rates of foster care placement per thousand 
children, there was no clear relationship between FPS and placement rates.44 
In any event, fluctuations in placement rates over a few years do not provide 
evidence for the effects of FPS because placement rates are affected by many 
factors outside of these programs.45 
There is also no convincing support for the cost-savings arguments put 
forth in Michigan. Family preservation programs clearly are more costly than 
traditional child welfare services for intact families and less costly than out- 
of-home placements. But, without convincing evidence that these programs 
prevent placements, there is no reason to expect substantial reductions in 
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costs. The California study is the only randomized experiment that provided 
data on service costs. Although the costs of FPS were said to "compare favor- 
ably" with the costs of out-of-home care, when the total costs of services 
provided and placements required by cases in the FPS and control group are 
compared, it is clear that FPS resulted in increased costs in California.46 
Bath and Haapala's conclusion that "there is strong evidence that FPS are 
able to significantly reduce the placement rates of served, at-risk children" 
(p. 389) appears to be based on three overflow comparison studies, the New 
Jersey experiment, and data on placement rates from the state of Michigan 
that, as we have seen, all suffer from threats to internal validity.47 The recom- 
mendation that "until convincing evidence is forthcoming, it would be wisest 
for program developers to base their initiatives on model program packages 
that have some proven effectiveness" (p. 399) is confusing. Without convincing 
evidence, there is no proof of effectiveness. 
In sum, the empirical evidence on the effects of FPS on the out-of-home 
placement of children is mixed. The findings of recent controlled studies call 
into question earlier claims about the success of FPS in preventing placement. 
The lack of effects on placement appears to be due, at least in part, to difficul- 
ties in targeting FPS to families that are truly "at risk" of placement. 
Targeting 
Bath and Haapala suggest that it is not "fair" to evaluate the outcomes of FPS 
when relatively few of the referred cases are at "imminent risk" of placement 
(as was the case in the three recent experiments). Yet, if FPS are to have a 
substantial effect on placements, they must first solve this targeting problem. 
Given widespread claims of the success of FPS in preventing placements and 
the rapid proliferation of state-supported FPS initiatives, it is certainly reason- 
able to assess both the targeting accuracy and placement prevention effects 
of FPS projects. 
Bath and Haapala imply that difficulties in the targeting of FPS are relatively 
new,48 but there is evidence to the contrary. Seven randomized experiments 
conducted in the 1970s and 1980s on programs that provided intensive in- 
home services designed to prevent placement showed that relatively few of 
the cases referred were at risk of placement.49 
The authors underestimate the complexity of issues in the targeting of FPS. 
This is more than a matter of workers' reluctance to refer the "right" cases. 
The need for placement is sometimes difficult to predict because family cir- 
cumstances can change rapidly and in ways that cannot always be foreseen 
by caseworkers. Although referring workers may not be certain about whether 
or when placement will be necessary, they sometimes state that placement is 
imminent in order to obtain thorough case assessments or services for families 
through FPS.so Many child protective services (CPS) workers believe that 
"unnecessary placements" are very rare; thus, in their view, there are few 
placements to be prevented. They often have other objectives for cases that 
they pursue through FPS.51 Workers knowingly refer cases that are not at 
risk of placement because there are few alternatives for these families."' The 
fact that FPS provide immediate, intensive, and concrete help for families in 
a service system in which such resources are scarce has led to an accretion 
and shifting of goals for FPS.53 To CPS workers, FPS may seem most useful 
in addressing previously unmet service needs of intact families,54 which consti- 
tute the largest proportion of cases in the child welfare system. Thus, although 
most CPS workers place a high value on the services provided by FPS pro- 
grams, they do not tend to view them as an alternative to placement.55 
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Contextual Issues 
Bath and Haapala provide a useful discussion of contextual factors that affect 
FPS and their evaluations. As they suggest, there are substantial variations 
across settings in client and community characteristics, ervice options, decision- 
making practices, and the policies and politics of child welfare. These varia- 
tions can limit the generalizability of FPS evaluations. 
Contrary to the authors' assertions, contextual factors have little to do with 
the internal validity of evaluations or the strength of conclusions one can 
draw about the effects of specific FPS programs.56 Rather, information about 
the service context can help us understand targeting problems, limitations of 
FPS, and why some approaches may be more successful in certain locations 
or with specific types of clients than others. 
Recognition of the unique contexts in which FPS operate also points to the 
need to tailor these services to fit local needs, even though this tailoring may 
contribute to "treatment inconsistency" and "model drift." Although it might 
be desirable to find program models that are so robust that they can withstand 
the various adaptations needed to be effective in different sites, it does not 
appear that this has been achieved in FPS.57 
All of this suggests that the question, Does FPS work?--which is the central 
concern of Bath and Haapala's review-does not adequately reflect real-world 
constraints and variations in the ways in which FPS operate. 
Toward More Realistic Expectations 
Is it reasonable to expect FPS (or any short-term intervention) to have dra- 
matic, lasting effects on family functioning, leading to substantial reductions 
in rates of out-of-home placement and the costs of child welfare services? The 
findings of recent experiments suggest that the answer to this question is no. 
This answer makes sense in light of the serious problems faced by families 
in the child welfare system, the lack of supports for these families outside of 
FPS, and the impact of larger social, economic, and environmental influences 
on families. We have suggested that the child welfare system alone cannot be 
expected to solve problems of substance abuse, poverty, mental illness, and family 
violence that can lead to child maltreatment and out-of-home placement."8 
What should we expect? The FPS experiments in New Jersey and Illinois 
found a few significant differences in favor of the FPS groups in measures of 
child and family functioning."9 In Illinois, it was shown that these effects were 
short-term and that they dissipated over time.60 Thus, it may be reasonable 
to hope for some positive changes in families as a result of FPS, although 
these benefits are likely to be modest and (in the absence of adequate follow- 
up services) short-term. 
Through intensive, in-home services we can learn a great deal about the 
nature of problems faced by the families in child welfare. In some cases, this 
will lead to the discovery of conditions that pose serious risks to children, new 
reports of child maltreatment, and out-of-home placements. The value of FPS 
is that they provide immediate, intensive, and flexible services where they are 
needed. But it is not realistic to expect these programs, remarkable as they 
are, to produce any quick fix. 
Conclusions 
What does the research on FPS really tell us? First, it tells us that there are 
widespread problems in the targeting of FPS.61 These programs are not serving 
the group of families for whom they were intended. It appears that FPS are 
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being used to serve aims other than placement prevention. Second, we have 
learned that the expectation that FPS will result in dramatic reductions in 
placements and in the costs of child welfare services is unrealistic. 
The debate over the effects of FPS still centers on very few rigorous studies. 
More solid evidence is needed, particularly on the effects of the Homebuilders 
model.62 There is also need for more refined analyses of effects of various 
types of FPS for different kinds of families. The question, Does FPS work? 
promotes an overly simplistic view of families, program processes, and the 
intricate "service context" in which they interact. 
Through the development of the Homebuilders program, Haapala and his 
colleagues have made extraordinary contributions to the field of child welfare. 
Homebuilders and other family preservation programs have resulted in tangi- 
ble improvements in the quality and quantity of services available to families 
in child welfare. These programs offer many examples of "best practice" in 
the field. Now, faced with mounting evidence that initial expectations for 
these programs have not been met, it is time to move beyond the rhetorical 
arguments that seem to engulf family preservation services toward new under- 
standings of what these programs can and cannot accomplish. 
Notes 
1. The three focal experiments are described in Leonard H. Feldman, "Assessing 
the Effectiveness of Family Preservation Services in New Jersey within an Ecological Context" (New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, Bureau of Research, 
Evaluation, and Quality Assurance, Trenton, N.J., 1991); Walter R. McDonald and 
associates, "Evaluation of AB 1562 In-Home Care Demonstration Projects: Final Re- 
port" (Walter R. McDonald and associates, Sacramento, Calif., 1990); and John R. 
Schuerman, Tina L. Rzepnicki, and Julia H. Littell, Putting Families First: An Experiment 
in Family Preservation (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994). 
2. Here, "theory" is used in its informal sense, meaning an explanation or conjecture. 
There is no single theory behind FPS; rather, these programs rely on various combina- 
tions of crisis intervention theory, family systems theory, social learning theory, and 
ecological theory (Richard P. Barth, "Theories Guiding Home-Based Intensive Family 
Preservation Services," in Reaching High Risk Families: Intensive Family Preservation in 
Human Services, ed. James K. Whittaker, Jill Kinney, Elizabeth M. Tracy, and Charlotte 
Booth [Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990]). 
3. For example, Jill Kinney, David Haapala, and Charlotte Booth stated that "for 
families with at least one child at imminent risk of placement, Homebuilders['] success 
in avoiding placement at 12 months following the initiation of service has varied from 
73 to 91% of families served" (Keeping Families Together: The Homebuilders Model [Haw- 
thorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991], p. 185). The assumption here is that the risk 
of placement has been reduced from 100 percent to 27 percent or less. 
4. Differences of 20 percent centered on 50 percent would result in placement rates 
of 60 percent in one group and 40 percent in the other. This difference is the same 
as a "generic effect size" of .4 (Mark W. Lipsey, Design Sensitivity: Statistical Power for 
Experimental Research [Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990]). Power estimates were derived 
from tables provided by Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 
2d ed. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1987). Estimates of the level of statistical 
power are based on the number of cases in the treatment and control groups. In the 
New Jersey study, there were 97 families in the control group and 117 in the FPS 
group-not including 33 cases assigned to FPS that were subsequently turned back 
and lost to follow-up (Feldman, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Family Preservation 
Services" [n. I above]). The California study had 152 families in both groups (McDonald 
and associates [n. 1 above]). In the Illinois experiment, there were 995 families in the 
FPS group and 569 controls; valid data on placements were available on 984 FPS cases 
and 552 control cases (Schuerman, Rzepnicki, and Littell, Putting Families First [n. 1 
above]). Because the treatment and control groups in the New Jersey and Illinois studies 
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were of unequal size, harmonic means were used to estimate power (the harmonic 
means are 106 for New Jersey and 707 for Illinois) (see Cohen [above]). The argument 
that effective sample sizes were actually much smaller, because of bad targeting, is 
specious. Targeting accuracy merely shifts the percentages. For example, in a well- 
targeted program, between-group differences may be centered on values over 50 per- 
cent (e.g., this would be the case if placement rates were 90% in one group and 70% 
in the other), whereas differences of the same magnitude will be centered on lower 
values in a poorly targeted program (e.g., placement rates of 30% and 10%). Differences 
centered on values above or below 50 percent yield relatively large effect sizes-that 
is, they are easier (require less statistical power) to detect than differences that center 
on 50 percent. However, there may be a "floor effect" when placement rates in the 
control group are so low that there are few placements to be prevented. In this case, 
any differences between groups are bound to be slight. This may have occurred in the 
first few months after random assignment in the Illinois study, although placement 
rates in the control group rose to over 20 percent within the first year (see Schuerman, 
Rzepnicki, and Littell, Putting Families First [n. I above]). 
5. Cohen (n. 4 above) recommends .8 as a minimum standard for statistical power. 
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Evaluation Outcomes of Family Preservation 
Services and the Way Ahead: A Reply to Littell 
Howard I. Bath 
Marymead Child and Family Centre, Canberra, Australia 
David A. Haapala 
Bold Solutions, Tacoma, Washington 
In her response to our article "Family Preservation Services: What Does the 
Outcome Research Really Tell Us?" (Social Service Review 68 [September 1994]: 
386-404), Julia Littell questions some of our arguments with particular refer- 
ence to the research undertaken by the Chapin Hall group.' The research 
from this group has contributed a great deal to our understanding of family 
preservation services (FPS) and the complex issues that surround their imple- 
mentation; however, the experimental component of their research and the 
conclusions that were reached were, we believe, fundamentally flawed. Con- 
ceptually, the experimental design was sound enough, but, as is often the case 
in such research, the researchers had little control over powerful factors in 
the service delivery context that led to serious problems with internal validity. 
It was the premise of our article that the no-effect conclusions from two major 
experimental, and widely cited, FPS evaluations "need to be interpreted with 
great caution" (p. 399)-in our view, this remains the case. 
Ironically, we find ourselves agreeing with both of the conclusions to Littell's 
paper, in particular, her assertion that "the question, Does FPS work? pro- 
motes an overly simplistic view of families, program processes, and the intricate 
'service context' in which they interact" (p. 346). It was precisely this concern 
that prompted our paper in the light of the simplistic interpretations of the 
Illinois and Californiaz evaluations that were gaining currency. We acknowl- 
edge that the authors of both studies were more cautious in interpreting 
their results than external commentators and the media have been, but these 
